Hidden Dangers: Threats of Surveillance Systems and the Need for Privacy Protection

It’s a well-kept secret that local police and the RCMP have quietly constructed an expansive network for public traffic surveillance. The details of its utilization remain shrouded in secrecy, leaving many curious about its true purpose and potential implications. Media outlets and law enforcement agencies across North America have hailed Automatic Licence Plate Recognition (ALPR) technology as a game-changer in law enforcement enthusiastically.

Truth Unveiled

Federal Privacy Commissioner’s Position

The federal Privacy Commissioner’s office issued statements refuting journalists’ and the RCMP’s claims of having obtained approval for ALPR. In fact, the Privacy Commissioner described the ALPR program to Parliament as “general and ubiquitous surveillance, without adequate safeguards.” The Commissioner emphasized the need for clear public disclosure of the program’s operations and information usage.

Access to Information Revelation

Through an Access to Information request, Wipond’s team unearthed a revealing 77-page Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) dated October 17, 2009. Contrary to public knowledge, the PIA indicated that the range of individuals generating “hits” in the ALPR system extends far beyond car thieves and child kidnappers. ALPR captures and retains data on the movements of individuals who are on parole or probation, have been accused of criminal offences, attended court for child custody matters, had mental health-related encounters with the police, or are linked to ongoing investigations. This extensive list of hit categories, partially redacted by the RCMP, raises questions about the system’s original purpose and how it aligns with official narratives.

Elusive Data: Uncovering Contradictions and Inconsistencies

Inquiries to both the RCMP and the VicPD for “all documents” related to ALPR yielded perplexing responses. While the VicPD initially claimed to have no data on ALPR, subsequent investigations exposed 500 pages of written, hard-copy logs documenting every ALPR hit. On the other hand, the RCMP’s response to the requests was marked by delays, document restrictions, and contradictory statements regarding the nature of the data collected.

Unresolved Questions

Real Agenda and Function Creep

The concerns surrounding surveillance have been a long-standing issue for Micheal Vonn, the policy director of the BC Civil Liberties Association. Expressing her worries about the lack of transparency, she compared the situation to something out of Lewis Carroll’s or Kafka’s works. The deliberate vagueness and constant shifting of targets by the police, particularly the RCMP, raise suspicions about their motives. According to Vonn, citizens should be deeply concerned not only about the surveillance technologies themselves but also about the government’s opacity.

Vonn disagreed with Diack’s dismissal of the Privacy Impact Assessment’s (PIA) differences from the actual program. She emphasized the importance of policy documents and their contents, comparing the attempt to comprehend the program to trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. The lack of clarity raises questions about the true intentions behind the ALPR system.

If an external contractor wrote the PIA for the RCMP, Vonn speculated that it might have been superficially applied. The real content and implications of the program remain unknown to the public.

Contrary to Diack and Nelson’s claims that the ALPR system does not collect personal information, Vonn criticized their argument. She pointed out that personal information encompasses any data that can identify an individual, and the police do not stop a car on suspicion of someone else driving it.

The RCMP’s intention to retain non-hit data for a year raised concerns. Vonn expressed shock at the prospect of establishing a massive surveillance system to monitor all travellers on the highway and the general population’s travel patterns. The initial rationale of combating car theft has quickly escalated to population-based surveillance, illustrating a clear case of function creep. The expansion of surveillance from stolen cars to encompassing everyone is alarming.

Distracting from Real Police Work?

The idea of recording and storing individuals’ whereabouts without probable cause, warrants, or consent sparked outrage among the public. McArthur, a fellow researcher, stressed that the recording of thousands of people’s movements on a daily basis crossed a line and posed a threat to democratic values.

Considering the potential implementation of BC’s ALPR system by the RCMP, McArthur highlighted that commercial ALPR software possesses built-in tools for movement mapping, data mining, and intelligence analysis. This could lead to individuals with unique travel patterns or residing in high-crime areas being subjected to greater scrutiny. However, the implications could extend even further.

The ALPR system goes beyond a simple license plate check against a database. It provides geographic information linking individuals who are in the same location, allowing for social network analysis and inference. McArthur warned about the dangers of this information falling into the wrong hands, envisioning potential abuse by future agencies or security services. Activities that should remain confidential, such as meeting with a journalist or organizing a trade union, could be jeopardized. The long-term consequences of unrestricted surveillance are cause for concern.

Vonn concurred with McArthur, noting that surveillance systems like ALPR often divert police resources from traditional policing activities. Instead of investigating specific crimes, the focus shifts to gathering intelligence. Criminal intelligence involves collecting data on the population with the presumption of potential wrongdoing. Such data may be used beyond judicial processes, leading to the creation of no-fly lists, the interception of protesters en route to demonstrations, or even restrictions on entering certain establishments, as seen in Vancouver’s program.

The shift from targeting individuals based on evidence of wrongdoing to a focus on perceived risks poses a significant threat. Vonn explained that the criteria for determining risk are based on formulas, algorithms, and data points, making it difficult for individuals to defend themselves against unjust suspicions.

While Diack and Nelson insist that ALPR is not meant for intelligence gathering, Christopher Parsons, another researcher, expressed skepticism about relying on good intentions alone. The lack of solid policies governing the system leaves room for the potential misuse by future RCMP, government agencies, secret services, or international organizations like US Homeland Security. Parsons emphasized that the nature of these programs is constantly evolving.

Who Protects Our Privacy?

Raymond Wacks, a privacy expert, highlights the fundamental importance of privacy, which forms the bedrock of free speech, free association, equality before the law, and individual freedom. However, as surveillance systems like ALPR continue to encroach upon our lives, the mechanisms to protect privacy are sorely lacking.

The legal limitations on police rights to gather personal information are meagre, as explained by Vonn from the BC Civil Liberties Association. The absence of clear parameters and case law creates uncertainty about what constitutes personal information collected for law enforcement purposes. Vonn foresees the need for a legal challenge or inquiry to address this broad definition and ensure transparency.

Modern surveillance technologies have removed the traditional limitations on police investigations due to resource constraints. Parsons pointed out that the proliferation of efficient surveillance mechanisms erodes the frictions that safeguard our freedoms.

Holding the police accountable is nearly impossible for the public. Agencies can withhold information for years, evading scrutiny. Privacy Commissioners, both at the federal and provincial levels, lack enforcement powers. They rely on collegial relationships and discussions rather than enforceable measures. The lack of official representatives willing to discuss controversial programs like ALPR raises concerns about transparency and accountability.

While Treasury Board holds the ultimate authority to ensure compliance with privacy laws, it remains unclear whether the RCMP’s Privacy Impact Assessment accurately reflects the program’s operations. The absence of a mandatory approval process by the Privacy Commissioner raises doubts about the safeguarding of Canadians’ privacy.

The Madrid Privacy Declaration, signed by privacy experts worldwide, calls for meaningful Privacy Impact Assessments and a moratorium on mass surveillance. Building on this, Parsons questioned why police do not collaborate more with civil liberties advocates to protect citizens.

Vonn emphasized the importance of responsible and transparent policing, advocating for civilian oversight. She highlighted the danger of relying on simplistic narratives of “good guys versus bad guys,” as it hinders open and honest debate. A free and democratic society should not tolerate an unaccountable surveillance infrastructure while being placated with misleading rhetoric.

As my research team reconvened, it became evident that even the most informed citizens on ALPR in Canada struggled to find answers to basic questions. The lack of public awareness and scrutiny surrounding these issues is concerning. Despite the presence of critical information in the RCMP’s Privacy Impact Assessment, it is unclear whether anyone outside our team has carefully reviewed it. The absence of accountability and transparency is alarming in the face of such extensive surveillance practices. It is time for a meaningful public debate on the implications of these systems and the protection of our privacy.